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During the current upswing in the Spanish economy, investment in equipment and 
intangible assets has been markedly buoyant. This strength, in absolute terms and 
relative to the euro area, is explained by a number of macroeconomic and microeconomic 
factors. Notable among these are the easing of external financial conditions and the 
availability of own funds to finance investment, the reduction in uncertainty and the greater 
export orientation of the business sector, in addition to the usual effect of the improvement 
in domestic demand during economic recoveries.
In the short and medium term, business investment will benefit from the existence 
of certain favourable circumstances. Notable among these are the economic expansion, 
which is expected to continue over the coming years, and the ongoing favourable financial 
conditions. In addition, investment should be boosted by improvement in some of the pre-
existing imbalances (in particular, the lower indebtedness of the business sector and a 
distribution of credit among companies more favourable to growth), as well as the 
competitiveness gains built up in past years, against a background in which external 
markets are expected to remain buoyant.
But there also remain certain obstacles, which may influence developments in the 
short, medium and long term. Factors that may limit investment in equipment and 
intangibles in the short term include, notably, the risks associated with a possible increase 
in economic uncertainty, both at global level (as consequence of increased protectionism, 
Brexit and the possibility of further episodes of political uncertainty in Europe) and at 
national level (a highly fragmented parliament and political uncertainty in Catalonia). In the 
medium term, certain factors persist that limit the potential growth of business investment 
and its effectiveness, including some linked to aspects of the institutional framework (in 
the areas of regulation, competition and effectiveness of the judicial system), tax distortions 
and the possibility of continued low levels of public productive investment. In the longer 
term, there are a number of trends, of a global nature, that may put downward pressure on 
investment, including especially the tertiarisation of economies, globalisation, technological 
change and population ageing.
Business investment is a fundamental element of the cyclical behaviour of the 
economy and long-term economic growth. On the expenditure side, gross fixed capital 
formation currently accounts for around 20% of GDP in Spain. Of this, one half is investment 
in equipment, machinery and intangible assets, while the other half is linked to residential 
and non-residential construction. Investment decisions determine the economy’s capital 
stock and thus affect its long-term growth, by enabling installed capital to be renewed and 
technological advances incorporated therein, as well as the productive capacity of firms to 
be expanded. Also, investment in research and development, among other activities, 
directly boosts technical progress. In the short term, this component of aggregate demand 
is the most volatile, and consequently its fluctuations drive the cyclical swings in production 
and employment.
This chapter explores the determinants of the recent buoyancy of investment in 
equipment and intangibles in the Spanish economy. The next section characterises the 
behaviour of these components of investment during the current upswing and provides an 
international comparison. The third section discusses the determinants of this behaviour, 
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distinguishing between financing conditions, export orientation and the evolution of 
uncertainty. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the drivers and constraints 
that will govern the future behaviour of investment in the short, medium and long-term.
Non-construction investment1 has been very buoyant during the current upswing in 
the Spanish economy. Between 2013 and 2017, this aggregate, which includes investment 
in equipment, machinery and intangible assets, increased in real terms by around 27%, 
while GDP grew by 12%. As a result, in 2017 it exceeded its pre-crisis level, having fallen 
during the recession by more than output (-13%, as against -8%) (see Chart 3.1.1). This 
type of investment has thus risen as a proportion of GDP over the last decade by around 
1 percentage point (pp), to somewhat over 10% of GDP in 2017, its highest level for the 
last three decades, when it has been on average around 9.5% of GDP (see Chart 3.1.3).
The recent strength of investment has been broadly based across the components 
of investment in equipment and in intangible assets.2 Investment in intangible assets 
(which includes items such as computer software, databases and R&D&I) accounted for 
around 30% of non-construction investment in 2017, as compared with 18% at the 
beginning of the century, and its cyclical volatility is well below that of equipment investment 
(see Chart 3.1.2). The latter underwent a major adjustment during the crisis, but its 
buoyancy during the recovery means that the previous losses have been more than offset, 
so that its level in 2017 was 3% higher than in 2007.
2  The buoyancy of 
investment in the 
recovery 
1  Gross fixed capital formation, in real terms, excluding “Dwellings” and “Other buildings and structures”, 
according to the National Accounts.
2  Investment in equipment refers to the category “Machinery and equipment and weapons systems” of the 
National Accounts, while investment in intangible assets refers to that of “Intellectual property products”.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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The momentum has been broad-based in terms of components, both in the case of equipment and machinery and intangible assets, which continued 
to be accumulated, even during the crisis, at the trend growth rate of recent decades. The behaviour of costruction-related investment, on the other hand, 
was less favourable, and in 2017 it still stood at somewhat less than 50% of its pre-crisis level.
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The improvement in non-construction investment was also broadly based across the 
productive sectors.3 Thus, the ratio of investment to value added was in most industries 
higher in the two-year period 2014-2015 (the latest year for which a breakdown is available) 
than in the pre-crisis period. The industries recording the largest increase in the ratio of 
investment to value-added were varied, including mining and quarrying, energy, information 
and communication, and administrative and support service activities (see Chart 3.2).
By contrast, the behaviour of construction-related investment4 has been much less 
favourable during the recovery, and in 2017 stood at less than 50% of its pre-crisis 
level. This aggregate behaviour reflects, first, the adjustment in housing investment, 
which, despite its recent improvement, was down to around 5% of GDP in 2017  (in line 
with levels in other European countries) from 12% before the crisis, following the major 
expansion of the residential sector that occurred from the late 1990s (see Chart 3.1.3). As 
for the rest of construction, it has now been declining as a percentage of GDP for a decade. 
In 2017, this item accounted for somewhat more than 5% of GDP, having fallen by some 4 
pp of GDP since 2007. The behaviour of this component largely reflects the impact of 
fiscal consolidation, which has essentially been based on cuts in public sector construction 
investment, including investment in transport infrastructure.5
After its sharp contraction during the last downturn, investment in equipment and 
intangible assets of the sectors most closely corresponding to public-sector activity6 
3  Excluding that part of the real-estate services sector that measures imputed property income.
4  This item includes the categories “Dwellings” and “Other buildings and structures” of the National Accounts.
5  See J. J. Pérez and I. Solera (2017), “Developments in public investment during the crisis and the recovery”, 
Economic Bulletin 4/2017, Banco de España.
SOURCE: INE.
a Industries: (1) Agriculture, forestry and fishing; (2) Mining and quarrying; (3) Manufacturing; (4) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; (5) Water supply; 
sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; (6) Construction (excluded); (7) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
(8) Transportation and storage; (9) Accommodation and food service activities; (10) Information and communication; (11) Financial and insurance activities; (12) 
Real estate activities; (13) Professional, scientific and technical activities; (14) Administrative and support service activities; (15) Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security; (16) Education; (17) Human health and social work activities; (18) Arts, entertainment and recreation; (19) Other service activities.
The improvement in non-construction investment was broadly based across industries. The ratio of investment to value added was in most industries 
higher in 2014-2015 than before the crisis.
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contributed to the strength of the recovery, albeit to a lesser extent than that of the 
rest of the sectors. Between 2013 and 2015, the equipment investment of these sectors, 
which accounts for around 10% of the total, grew in line with that of the rest, recovering to 
somewhat more than 90% of its pre-crisis level (see Chart 3.1.5). Investment in intellectual-
property-related products by those sectors with a larger public-sector involvement (which 
accounts for somewhat more than 15% of the total) continued to display the slight 
downtrend that began in 2011, in contrast to the buoyancy observed in the rest of the 
sectors (see Chart 3.1.6).
The recent behaviour of equipment investment is similar to that seen at the same 
stage of the cycle in the 1990s, despite the major deleveraging by non-financial 
corporations in recent years.7 Unlike in the cycle of the 1990s, the crisis that began in 
2008 gave rise to two consecutive recessions, so that a comparison of the upturn that 
began in late 2013 with that which began in 1993 may be distorted by the fact that the 
initial position of the economy was not the same. Historical evidence suggests that 
recessions that are accompanied by severe business deleveraging usually have more 
persistent negative effects on investment,8 so that one would expect investment to behave 
less favourably in the latest cycle than in the 1990s. However, the growth of investment 
since 2013 has been higher than predicted by its historical relationship with economic 
activity, despite the major reduction in corporate debt that has taken place during much of 
the recovery (see Charts 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3).
Investment is behaving somewhat more favourably in Spain in the recovery than in 
the euro area as a whole. The dynamics of investment in the euro area as a whole, 
however, are markedly heterogeneous across countries. Of the four largest euro area 
countries, Italy has recorded the poorest relative performance by non-construction 
investment since end-2013 and France the most favourable (see Charts 3.3.4, 3.3.5 and 
3.3.6). The weakness of business investment at global level in the early years of the 
recovery has been analysed in a large number of recent studies.9 In the case of the euro 
area countries, however, the evidence available shows that, in most of them, business 
investment has moved in line with aggregate activity. The more favourable behaviour of 
non-construction investment relative to GDP in Spain has enabled the gap with the main 
euro area countries to be closed. As regards its composition, equipment investment as a 
proportion of total investment was, in 2017, higher in Spain (70%) than on average in 
Germany, France and Italy (60%), while the weight of intangibles investment in Spain was 
lower than in these countries.
From a more global perspective, investment has grown more moderately in the euro 
area than in the United States, which has a significantly higher investment-to-GDP 
ratio. Over the last two decades, the US economy has recorded more significant increases 
in business investment than the euro area, both in the case of equipment investment and 
6  Defined, in this case, as the sectors “Public administration and defence; compulsory social security”, “Education” 
and “Health and social services”, according to the INE. In the latter two sectors, however, although the majority 
of the activity is public, activity is also performed by privately owned and controlled firms. Likewise, in other 
sectors there is also a significant presence of firms that are mainly publicly owned firms (e.g. ADIF and AENA). 
Unfortunately, the official statistics do not allow a better separation of public and private activity.
7  There is no official information of the INE on investment in intellectual property assets for the period before 1995.
8  See, inter alia, Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), “The economic crisis of the 1990’s in Finland”, Economic Policy, 
14, pp. 401-436.
9  See M. Banbura et al. (2018), “Low investment in the EU”, Occasional Paper, ECB, forthcoming, or J. C. Berganza, 
S. Romero, T. Sastre, P. Burriel and M. Folch (2015), «La debilidad de la inversión empresarial en las economía 
desarrolladas”, Boletín Económico, July-August, Banco de España. 
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The recent behaviour of equipment investment has been similar to that in the cyclical episode in the 1990s, despite the heavy deleveraging by 
non-financial corporations. Also, investment has performed relatively more favourably in the recovery in Spain than in the euro area as a whole.
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in that of intangible assets (see Chart 3.4). Notwithstanding this, in recent years the euro 
area appears to have closed most of the gap in intangibles.10 Given how important the 
latter have become in the developed economies, Box 3.1 explores the definition and 
measurement of intangibles and the implications that a higher proportion of this type of 
assets entails for the economy’s technical progress and aggregate productivity.
The healthy growth of investment by Spanish firms, with respect to euro area firms, 
is explained by a number of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors. Notable 
among these have been the improvement in external financial conditions, the use of own 
funds to finance investment, the reduction in economic and political uncertainty, and the 
strengthening of the export orientation of Spanish firms in recent years. The easing of 
financial conditions since 2013 and an improved allocation of financial flows to the benefit 
of more productive firms appears to have had a more favourable impact on firms in Spain 
than in the euro area as a whole, given the less favourable initial position of Spanish 
companies on aggregate, in terms of greater credit constraints, the higher cost of accessing 
credit, and heavy business deleveraging.11 Also, the reduction in uncertainty, following the 
episodes of sovereign crisis in the euro area between 2010 and 2012, would have most 
favoured those economies, like the Spanish one, that showed greater vulnerability during 
this phase of the crisis. Moreover, the strength of investment in Spain in the most recent 
period has remained based on two fundamental supports that operated during the last 
downturn: the relatively high availability of own funds and the shift in the composition of 
demand since the start of the crisis from the domestic to the external component. The 
latter entailed a need for greater investment on aggregate, to maintain the momentum of 
strong growth in the Spanish economy’s export capacity. The contribution of these 
elements is analysed in detail below.
Internal sources of financing played a significant role in the behaviour of investment 
during the crisis and also in the subsequent recovery. In the early stages of the crisis 
the tensions in wholesale financial markets had a contractionary impact on the supply of 
bank credit. In these circumstances, financial institutions passed on the rise in the cost of 
financing their lending to businesses. In an economy as highly banked as the Spanish one, 
these developments led many firms to replace bank credit, at least partially, with alternative 
sources of financing, such as securities issuance, in the case of large firms and, more 
generally, greater use of own funds, through increases in the gross operating surplus, 
normally known as the “profit margin”.12 There is some evidence that this countercyclical 
behaviour by margins was not confined exclusively to Spain, but was also seen in other 
euro area countries subject to significant financial strains during the crisis (such as Portugal 
and Ireland),13 and in the United States.14 In the recovery sources of internal funding have 
continued to have a high weight, although the measures adopted by national and European 
authorities, including the expansionary monetary policy implemented in recent years by 
the ECB, have led to considerable improvement in the conditions of access to bank and 
non-bank financing (see Chart 3.5). Indeed, the use of own funds has been particularly 
important during the crisis and the recovery for financing investment in intangible assets, 
3  The recovery of 
investment: financing, 
uncertainty and export 
orientation 
3.1  THE FINANCING  
OF INVESTMENT
10  A structural explanation for this is to be found in R. Döttling, G. Gutiérrez and T. Philipon (2017), “Is there an 
investment gap in advanced economies? If so, why?”, ECB Forum of Central Banking, June.
11  Regarding the financing of investment in Spain, see Chapter 2, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España.
12  See Chapter 2, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España, or J. M. Montero and A. Urtasun (2014), “Price-cost 
mark-ups in the Spanish economy: a microeconomic perspective”, Working Paper 1407, Banco de España.
13  See Chapter 4, Annual Report 2014, Banco de España.
14  See S. Gilchrist, J. W. Sim and E. Zakrajšek (2014), Uncertainty, Financial Frictions, and Investment Dynamics, 
NBER Working Paper, No 20038, National Bureau of Economic Research, United States.
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From a global perspective, investment in the euro area has been more subdued than in the United States, which has a significantly higher 
investment/output ratio. Even so, the euro area appears to have closed a large part of the gap existing in the case of intangibles. In the case of Spain, 
the weight of intangibles investment is lower than on average in the main euro area countries.
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SOURCES: INE, Banco de España and ECB (SAFE).
a Cumulative four-quarter flows.
b Including statistical adjustments.
c Including loans from residents and non-residents.
d Gross saving plus net capital transfers.
e Net investment is understood to be the flow of (tangible and intangible) gross fixed capital formation net of capital consumption.
The internal sources of financing of investment not only played a significant role during the crisis, but also during the subsequent recovery. Also, aggregate 
deleveraging by the non-financial corporations sector in recent years has been compatible with a reallocation of flows of financing towards more 
productive firms.
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which may reflect the greater difficulty of accessing external financing to fund projects 
involving investment in this type of asset.15
Moreover, the aggregate deleveraging by the non-financial corporations sector in 
recent years has been compatible with a reallocation of flows of financing towards 
more productive firms. Against a background of more significant improvement in financial 
conditions in the Spanish economy than in the euro area as a whole, credit has generally 
flowed to those firms in a better economic and financial position, which has boosted 
investment, given that these firms are in a better situation to undertake new projects. The 
proportion of companies that have carried out investment in recent years has increased, as 
also has the average amount invested by each firm (see Charts 3.5.5 and 3.5.6). In addition, 
the allocation of credit is now more efficient than it was before the crisis, insofar as funds tend 
to flow to firms that are, on average, more productive and in a healthier financial position.16 
These developments contrast with the evidence existing for the pre-crisis period, which 
shows that investment was mainly earmarked for projects offering better collateral, which led 
to a concentration in less productive sectors and, within these, in less productive firms.17
Uncertainty has been significantly reduced in recent years, from the peak levels 
recorded in 2012.18 According to the available indicators, the reduction in uncertainty 
during the recovery was especially significant up to the end of 2015, after which it rose 
again, as a result of the political uncertainty linked to the high degree of parliamentary 
fragmentation that followed the elections held in December 2015 and June 2016 and, 
more recently, since mid-2017, owing to the tensions relating to the political situation in 
Catalonia (see Chart 3.6).
The evidence available for Spain shows that the moderation in uncertainty has 
had positive effects on firms’ investment decisions. One of the normal characteristics 
of investment processes is the timing mismatch between the costs of expanding 
productive capital, which firms incur in the short-term, and the income flows obtained 
from the investment, which only materialise over a much longer time horizon and cannot 
be precisely estimated ex ante. Consequently, a reduction in the level of uncertainty 
leads firms to embark on investment projects that they would otherwise have postponed 
until more information was available. In fact, according to the studies available for 
Spain, the effect of a reduction in uncertainty has significant positive effects on 
investment19 (see Chart 3.6.3). It is also important to distinguish between types of firm, 
3.2  THE REDUCTION  
IN UNCERTAINTY
15  See D. Dejuán, A. Menéndez and M. Mulino (2018), “Evolución de la inversión en el sector empresarial no 
financiero español”, Boletín Económico, Banco de España, forthcoming.
16  See Chapter 2, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España.
17  See Ó. Arce, J. M. Campa and A. Gavilán (2013), “Macroeconomic adjustment under loose financing conditions 
in the construction sector”, European Economic Review, 59, pp. 19-34; S. Basco, D. López Rodríguez and E. 
Moral-Benito (2017), Housing Bubbles and misallocation: evidence from Spain, Working Paper, Banco de 
España, forthcoming; Martín, Moral-Benito y Schmitz (2018), The Financial Transmission of Sectoral Shocks: 
Evidence from the Spanish Housing Bubble, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming, and G. Jiménez, 
E. Moral-Benito and R. Vegas (2018), Bank Lending Standards over the Cycle: The Role of Firms’ Productivity 
and Credit Risk, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
18  Measuring the degree of uncertainty is complicated, although diverse indicators may be constructed to enable 
it to be proxied. See M. Gil, J. J. Pérez and A. Urtasun (2017), “Macroeconomic uncertainty: measurement and 
impact on the Spanish economy”, Boletín Económico, 1/2017, Banco de España for a discussion of the 
literature and a proposal for indicators for the  Spanish economy.
19  Based on VAR-type (vector autoregressive) models, which incorporate indicators of uncertainty and equipment 
investment. The Spanish sovereign debt spread over Germany and a price index are also included as additional 
control variables, to take into account the possible effects of the financial and nominal variables on the different 
indicators of uncertainty. The analysis also takes into account the effect of uncertainty arising from the external 
environment, in particular the EU, so that the effects of national idiosyncratic shocks can be isolated.
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since the effect of uncertainty may vary according to their characteristics (see Chart 3.6.4). 
Specifically, the latest studies20 show that small and medium-sized firms are more 
vulnerable to shocks arising from economic uncertainty and react to such shocks more 
20  See D. Dejuán and C. Ghirelli (2018), Determinants of  firms’ investment in Spain: the role of policy uncertainty, 
Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming. This paper provides a detailed analysis of various determinants 
of investment using microdata of Spanish firms for the period 1997-2014 from the Banco de España’s Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office. The paper refers to the literature on these factors, emphasising the importance of 
determinants that are both internal and external to the firm.
SOURCES: INE, FUNCAS forecast panels, European Commission, CIS barometer, PRS Group, www.policyuncertainty.com and Banco de España.
a Synthetic indicator compiled by applying the principal components technique, using information from the indicators of assessment of the current political situation 
and of political expectations of the CIS, the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU), the political risk indicator (PRS Group) and the degree of disagreement in 
budget deficit forecasts.
b The VAR model includes: as endogenous variables, uncertainty as measured by the synthetic indicators of financial markets, disagreement and economic policy 
uncertainty, investment, the Spanish sovereign debt spread over the German Bund and a price index; and as exogenous variables, EURO STOXX 50 volatility, the 
EPU for the EU as a whole and a synthetic indicator of European uncertainty (calculated in a similar manner to that used for Spain's synthetic indicators).    
    Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
c Synthetic indicator compiled by applying the principal components technique, using information from indicators of the volatility of the IBEX 35, the exchange rate, 
the oil price and the ten-year bond price.
d Synthetic indicator compiled by applying the principal components technique, using information from indicators of the disagreement in forecasts of GDP, private 
consumption and equipment investment, uncertainty about the outlook for unemployment over the next twelve months, uncertainty about industrial order books 
and uncertainty about industrial production expectations.
e. Ratio of business investment to capital, according to Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office.
Economic uncertainty has diminished significantly during the recent recovery in Spain, from the highs recorded in 2012. The evidence available, based 
on both aggregate and individual data, shows that a less uncertain environment is conducive to business investment.
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1  ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY IN SPAIN (a)
Differences relative to the average since 1997 (number of standard deviations)
UNCERTAINTY HAS DIMINISHED IN RECENT YEARS, FROM ITS HIGHS IN 2012, WHICH HAS PROBABLY
HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON INVESTMENT
CHART 3.6
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
11%
12%
13%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
OBSERVED INVESTMENT RATIO (e)
COUNTERFACTUAL: INVESTMENT RATIO, KEEPING UNCERTAINTY AT 2012 LEVEL 
4  EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY: MODEL WITH INDIVIDUAL DATA
Ratio of investment to capital, as a percentage
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
2008-2012 2013-2015 2016-2017
GERMANY SPAIN
2  UNCERTAINTY AS MEASURED BY THE EPU: SPAIN AND GERMANY  
Change in points in each period
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SYNTHETIC INDICATOR OF UNCERTAINTY IN FINANCIAL MARKETS (c)
SYNTHETIC INDICATOR OF ECONOMIC AND POLICY UNCERTAINTY 
SYNTHETIC INDICATOR OF THE DEGREE OF DISAGREEMENT AMONG AGENTS (d)
3  EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY: MODEL WITH AGGREGATE DATA (b)
Response of equipment investment to an increase in the uncertainty indicator (pp)
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 128 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 3. THE BUOYANCY OF INVESTMENT IN THE RECOVERY: DETERMINANTS AND CHALLENGES
strongly. Also, responses are found to vary according to financial position, so that those 
with a high debt ratio are more severely affected by uncertainty.21
During the crisis and subsequent recovery, the export orientation of Spanish firms 
has increased, boosting investment. The significant increase in sales to the rest of the 
world in recent years has been based, on one hand, on the recovery of the competitiveness 
that the Spanish economy lost during the pre-crisis expansion; price and cost adjustment 
has generated a depreciation of the real exchange rate, which would appear to have 
contributed to the dynamism of exports during this period (see Chart 3.7.1). Also, Spanish 
firms increased their orientation towards external markets given the weakness of domestic 
3.3  GREATER EXPORT 
ORIENTATION
21  With debt ratio values above the median value of the distribution of this variable. This effect is directly related 
to the importance of financial frictions and the effect of uncertainty on the demand for and supply of credit. 
Having low levels of profitability, however, does not seem to explain the differing effects of the impact of 
uncertainty.
SOURCES: INE and Eurostat.
a Results of the Quarterly Model of the Banco de España (MTBE).
The export orientation of the Spanish economy has increased during the crisis and the recovery, boosting business investment. The favourable behaviour 
of exports has been partly based on the recovery of the price competitiveness that the Spanish economy lost during the upswing prior to the crisis. Also, 
given the weakness of domestic demand, Spanish firms have become more external-market oriented.
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demand, which would appear to have translated into an increase in the volume of exports 
and in the number of firms that are regular exporters. Specifically, among manufacturing 
firms, those with the largest presence in external markets were able to partly offset the fall 
in their domestic sales with increases in their exports, a process that was assisted by 
labour cost moderation. According to the estimates available, between 2009 and 2013, 
these firms on average replaced around one-third of their lost domestic sales with sales in 
foreign markets.22
The relevance of the increase in export orientation for investment is confirmed by an 
analysis of the individual decisions of firms based on recent data. The tendency for 
exporting firms to show high investment-to-capital ratios has increased during the recovery 
(see Chart  3.7.4).23 This has occurred through two channels. First, exporting firms are 
characterised by having higher investment-to-capital ratios, so that growth in the number 
of exporting firms (extensive margin) has boosted investment. Second, the recovery in the 
investment of exporting firms seems to have been somewhat stronger than the recovery in 
that of non-exporting firms, so that the increase in sales abroad by the former (intensive 
margin) has also been a factor favouring the dynamism of investment. The investment-to-
capital ratio of exporting firms began to increase in 2010, while that of non-exporting firms 
did not do so until 2013. This may partly be explained by the lower sensitivity among the 
former to increases in domestic uncertainty, as well as by the above-mentioned replacement 
of domestic demand by foreign demand. 
The increase in investment was higher than was to be expected from the behaviour 
of aggregate demand, which may indicate greater capacity utilisation among 
exporting firms. Insofar as firms that satisfy domestic demand and demand from the rest 
of the world are not the same, this reorientation of production towards export activity may 
have caused the aggregate behaviour of capacity utilisation to mask disparate behaviour 
at sectoral level. Thus, it is possible that during the recession exporting industries 
maintained approximately full capacity utilisation, which would help to explain why 
investment behaved more favourably during the recovery than was to be expected from 
the evolution of aggregate demand.24
The role of the determinants highlighted in the previous section is consistent with a 
structural interpretation of the recent behaviour of corporate investment in Spain.25 
Under the general equilibrium model estimated for the Spanish economy, the low growth 
of private productive investment26 in the period 2011-2012 is explained by the adverse 
effects of the financial factors and negative (private and public) demand shocks. These 
contractionary effects began to disappear in 2013 and to be replaced by a clearly positive 
impact arising from wage moderation, which generated an expansionary effect during 
3.4  THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
THE VARIOUS 
DETERMINANTS OF 
INVESTMENT IN A 
STRUCTURAL MODEL
22  See P. Antràs, M. Almunia, D. López Rodríguez and E. Morales (2018), Venting Out: Exports during a Domestic 
Slump, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming. See also P. Soares and E. Prades (2017), “Does export 
concentration matter in economic adjustment programs? Evidence from the euro-area”, Journal of Policy Modelling.
23  See D. Dejuán and C. Ghirelli (2018), op. cit.
24  See D. Posada, J. M. González Mínguez and A. Urtasun (2014), “Un análisis del comportamiento reciente de la 
inversión en equipo y de sus determinantes”, Boletín Económico, June, Banco de España.
25  See G. Almeida, S. Hurtado and O. Rachedi, JoSE: Joint Spain-Euro-Area Model, Working Paper, Banco de 
España, forthcoming.
26  The definition of investment in this model is slightly different to that discussed in the previous section. It is 
defined as total investment, excluding housing and general government. With respect to the concept of 
investment in equipment and intangibles used as reference, it therefore includes private construction. Also, 
although the general government sector is excluded, all the investment activity of the non-general government 
corporate public sector, responsible for most of the public infrastructure and other investment of this sector, is 
included (see J. J. Pérez and I. Solera (2017), “Developments in public investment during the crisis and the 
recovery”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España).
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subsequent years, especially through the export channel. From 2015, the recovery in 
private demand also began to have a positive influence. Likewise, the contribution of the 
financial factors to growth, which had become neutral in 2013, was clearly positive 
between 2014 and 2016. Thus, according to this model, the strong growth of investment 
in recent years is explained mainly by the re-emergence of positive domestic demand 
shocks, the expansionary effects of wage moderation (competitiveness) and the 
normalisation of financial conditions (see Chart 3.8).
The positive developments in financial conditions and in the availability of financing 
are expected to continue, which will provide ongoing support to the momentum of 
investment. As mentioned above, the measures adopted by the ECB have boosted access 
to funding through bank credit and the issuance of debt instruments, and have permitted a 
very low interest rate scenario. Looking ahead, monetary and financial conditions are 
expected to remain favourable to investment for a protracted period of time (see Chart 3.9.1). 
Similarly, the restructuring and reorganisation process of the credit institutions sector in 
Spain and progress in the area of the banking union within Europe should be conducive to 
the proper functioning of lending activity (see Chapter 2 of this report).
Progress in the correction of imbalances in the corporate sector, especially the debt 
overhang, should allow companies to undertake investment projects on a sounder 
footing. Higher corporate saving has facilitated internal financing, at the same time as the 
balance sheet restructuring of firms and the improved outlook for returns have made it easier for 
companies to tap external funds (see Chart 3.9.2). Accordingly, the available studies for the 
case of Spain, which are based on individual data, show that there is a non-linear relationship 
between debt levels and business investment, with the result that the adverse effect of the 
former on the latter, ceteris paribus, would be significant for high debt levels and its impact 
would be less relevant at present, following the sharp deleveraging that has taken place.27
4  Favourable 
circumstances and 
constraints for 
investment in the short 
and medium term
4.1  FAVOURABLE 
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE 
MOMENTUM OF 
INVESTMENT
27  See, in particular, F. Herranz González and C. Martínez Carrascal (2017), The impact of firms’ financial position 
on fixed investment and employment. An analysis for Spain, Working Paper 1714, Banco de España.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Difference between GFCF and the aggregate of housing investment and public investment.
From a macroeconomic standpoint, the key role of financial conditions, internal financing, domestic and foreign demand would be consistent with a 
structural interpretation of recent developments in business investment in Spain.
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Likewise, the outlook for economic growth is also favourable for investment activity. 
The medium-term outlook for the Spanish economy remains positive: GDP growth of more 
than 2%28 – above the euro area average – is expected over the next few years (see 
Chart 3.9.3). Progress made in restoring macro-financial equilibria (especially the correction 
of the loss of competitiveness and high private indebtedness after the start of the crisis) is 
making for a strong and possibly more sustainable recovery than in other upturns.29
In a scenario of these characteristics, corporate investment could retain its 
momentum in step with the higher degree of capacity utilisation.  Although the ratio 
of investment in equipment to GDP is estimated to have stood at levels close to its trend 
28  Specifically, according to the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco de 
España, real GDP is estimated to show increases of 2.7% in 2018, 2.3% in 2019 and 2.1% in 2020.
29  See Chapter 1 of this report.
SOURCES: INE, Banco de España, AMECO and IMF.
a IMF (WEO Report, October 2017).
b Difference between the ratio of equipment investment to GDP and the estimated trend of this ratio (unobserved components model). See D. Leiva, J. J. Pérez, G. 
Pérez Quirós and A. Urtasun (2018), An empirical model of the basic macroeconomic stylised facts of the Spanish economy, Working Papers, Banco de España, 
forthcoming.
A series of factors will favour protracted buoyant investment in the short and medium term including most notably, ongoing positive financial conditions, 
the correction of business sector imbalances and an outlook of a continued recovery in the Spanish economy.
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in 2017, there may be additional gains given the current firming of the recovery of the 
Spanish economy30 (see Chart 3.9.4). Accordingly, on one hand, capacity utilisation is at 
very high levels in certain sectors and to a greater extent in those related to exports31 (see 
Chart 3.10.1). On the other, during the last decade capital obsolescence has occurred with 
most investment earmarked for covering capital depreciation (see Chart 3.10.4). Finally, 
the price of investment goods relative to other goods 32 has fallen in Spain since 2005 
(when its peak of the last two decades was recorded) by slightly more than 11% (–1.7% in 
the euro area as a whole) and, thus that lower relative price could have a positive effect on 
investment decisions (see Chart 3.10.5).
The persistence of short-term risks could prompt heightened uncertainty, both 
globally and in Spain, curtailing investment projects. From a global standpoint, recently, 
several threats to the momentum of world trade have emerged, owing to protectionist 
trends in certain countries (especially, in the United States) and to Brexit (see Chart 3.11.1). 
At national level, the materialisation of a fresh scenario of heightened political uncertainty 
such as that observed during most of 2016 or in relation to the political situation in 
Catalonia (see Box 1.1. of Chapter 1 of this report) could negatively impact agents’ 
confidence and business investment.33
Also, current low levels of public investment could restrict business investment 
insofar as the former complements and acts as a catalyst for the latter. Public-sector 
investment has made a highly significant contribution to the recent budget deficit reduction 
process to the extent that all its components34 recorded their lowest levels of recent 
decades (for infrastructure, see Chart  3.11.2). In this setting, evidence shows that a 
positive relationship exists between aggregate productivity of the economy and so-called 
“productive public spending” with a significant impact on potential growth. Business 
investment is a particularly significant channel through which this impact materialises, 
both direct business investment (by state-owned or state-controlled companies) and 
indirect business investment (via the private sector). Although funds earmarked for public-
sector investment could represent the crowding out of private-sector activity in the short 
term,35 the aggregate impact of higher public-sector investment on private activity is 
generally positive in the long term, insofar as productive public capital expands, resulting 
in an improvement in the return on private factors (complementarity or crowding in 
4.2  POSSIBLE INVESTMENT 
CONSTRAINTS AND 
OBSTACLES IN THE SHORT 
AND MEDIUM TERM
30  See D. Leiva, J. J. Pérez, G. Pérez Quirós and A. Urtasun (2018), “An empirical model of the basic macroeconomic 
stylised facts of the Spanish economy”, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
31  Among others, noteworthy is the high capacity utilisation in the industries of manufacture of electrical 
equipment, manufacture of machinery and equipment, manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, 
and manufacture of other transport equipment.
32  Measured as the ratio between the investment deflator and the GDP deflator.
33  For an analysis of the potential effects of a scenario of a more abrupt and persistent increase in political 
uncertainty, see, for example, the box in the Financial Stability Report, Banco de España, November 2017, on 
the hypothetical scenarios triggered by the episode of political tension in Catalonia at the end of last year (see 
Box 1.1, “The economic impact of uncertainty arising from political tensions in Catalonia”, in the Financial 
Stability Report, November 2017, Banco de España). Specifically, this box simulates a hypothetical scenario 
assuming an increase in uncertainty in a given quarter which is equivalent to the uncertainty recorded in the 
most intense previous episode, and a subsequent linear decline until the uncertainty disappears after two 
years. In this case, the estimated negative effect on GDP is slightly more than 2.5 pp in cumulative terms over 
those two years.
34  See J. J. Pérez and I. Solera (2017), “Developments in public investment during the crisis and the recovery”, 
Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España.
35  The available evidence for Spain tends to find positive effects in the short term. In particular, M. Alloza, P. 
Burriel and J. J. Pérez (2018), “Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area: Revisiting the Size of Spillovers”, Working 
Papers, Banco de España, forthcoming, find that each euro spent on public investment would generate a 
cumulative increase after two years of nearly €2 in terms of GDP and between €0.5 and €1 in terms of private 
productive investment.
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of chemical products; (21) Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations; (22) Manufacture of plastics; (23) Manufacture of other 
non-metallic mineral products; (24) Manufacture and first processing of metals; (25) Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment; 
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In a scenario of continued recovery of the Spanish economy, business investment would remain buoyant in keeping with a higher degree of capacity 
utilisation.
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effects).36 From this standpoint, public spending on infrastructure and R&D&I activities is 
particularly important, these items would affect aggregate economic activity and private 
investment to a greater extent.37 Accordingly, note that public investment in R&D in Spain 
36  The final effect will depend, in any event, on the design of the investment plan (implementation period and 
duration, degree of distortion of the fiscal instrument used to finance it) or on other macroeconomic aspects 
such as the interest rate response to public investment stimulus or the degree of nominal rigidities present in 
the economy. For a review of the theoretical arguments and channels, see M. Baxter and R. King (1993), “Fiscal 
Policy in General Equilibrium”, American Economic Review, or E. Leeper, T. Walker and Yang (2010), 
“Government investment and fiscal stimulus”, Journal of Monetary Economics.
37  See, for example, Bom and Ligthart (2014), “What have we learned from three decades of research on the 
productivity of public capital?”, Journal of Economic Surveys, and Comín, Licht, Pellens and Schubert (2018), 
“Do Companies Benefit from Public Research Organizations? The Impact of the Fraunhofer Society in Germany”, 
Centre for Innovation, Research and Competence in the Learning Economy.
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There is a series of factors which could curb the momentum of investment in the short and medium term, if suitable policies are not implemented. These 
factors include, most notably, global and national risks which could increase uncertainty, low public investment, the shortcomings of the institutional 
framework and distortions arising from the corporate income tax system.
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amounted to 0.50% of GDP in 2015 compared with the EU aggregate of 0.62% (Germany: 
0.81%; France: 0.79%; and Italy: 0.51%).38
The weight of public investment in R&D is smaller, furthermore, in a setting of 
significantly lower private investment in this area than in benchmark countries. 
According to the OECD, investment in R&D in Spain’s total economy (public and private) 
stood at 1.2% of GDP in 2015, which is lower than the EU aggregate of 2% and much 
smaller than the figures for Germany and France (2.9% and 2.3%, respectively).39 More 
generally, the weight of investment in intangible assets in Spain remains low, in relative 
terms, despite the rising trend of recent decades. Compared to other European countries, 
in 2016 the Spanish economy’s investment drive in intangible assets (measured as its 
weight in GDP) was 1.2 pp of GDP lower than the euro area aggregate (see Chart 2 of Box 
3.1). From this standpoint, it is important for the recent vigour in investment in intangible 
assets to continue so that this gap closes, given their increasing significance in production 
processes and their impact on productivity gains. 
As for other structural conditioning factors, certain shortcomings in institutional 
arrangements, including several regulatory factors, are not conducive to business 
dynamism. The available empirical evidence points to tighter regulations tending to be 
associated with lower business investment.40 Notwithstanding the improvements made 
during the crisis, Spain’s regulatory framework continues to entail certain constraints, 
since it is generally more restrictive than that of benchmark European economies such as 
Germany and the United Kingdom, according to the habitually used indicators such as 
those of the OECD’s Product Market Regulation, the World Bank’s Doing Business report 
or the Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom indicators (see Chart 3.11.3).41
Reforms aimed at improving the use and quality of productive factors and the 
efficient operation of product markets and factors are essential for boosting 
productive investment and economic growth in the medium and long term. The 
effects of these reforms could be particularly positive during the present boom since 
the adjustment costs they entail can be met to a greater degree.42 Similarly, in a 
monetary union, the application of structural reforms aimed at reducing barriers to 
competition may stimulate business investment significantly, even in the short term and 
in situations in which the additional accommodative capacity of monetary policy is 
constrained (see Box 3.4).43
A stable framework of relationships between firms needs arrangements which 
ensure that rules and agreements are enforced. An inefficient agreement enforcement 
system generates greater legal uncertainty, adversely affecting investment and 
productivity. This adverse impact is, furthermore, greater in the case of intangible assets 
38  See OECD (2017), “Main Science and Technology Indicators”, Vol. 2017, 2.
39  See again, OECD (2017), op. cit.
40  See European Central Bank (2016), “Business investment developments in the euro area since the crisis”, 
October and G. Palumbo, G. Giupponi, L. Nunziata and J. S. Mora-Sanguinetti (2013), “The Economics of Civil 
Justice: New Cross-Country Data and Empirics”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 1060.
41  For example, the OECD points out that administrative burdens on start-ups are generally greater in Spain. 
Registering a sole proprietorship takes more time in Spain than in Germany and in the United Kingdom. It is also 
necessary to contact a larger number of public bodies to register a public limited company.  
42  The “Report on Structural Policies in the euro area”, a forthcoming Occasional Paper of the ECB, contains a 
detailed discussion on the relationship between cyclical position and the costs of reforms.
43  See Ó. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2016), “Policy Spillovers and Synergies in a Monetary Union”, 
International Journal of Central Banking, and OECD (2012), “Reducing income inequality while boosting 
economic growth: can it be done?”, Economic Policy Reforms.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 136 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 3. THE BUOYANCY OF INVESTMENT IN THE RECOVERY: DETERMINANTS AND CHALLENGES
(such as copyright and patents), which are more complex to protect. In the case of 
Spain, there is evidence of the link between the effectiveness of the legal system and 
investment, as well as between the former and the entry of new firms into markets and 
their subsequent growth.44
Taxation also influences firms’ investment decisions. Economic research has underlined 
the potential for taxation on the purchase of productive assets and on the related returns 
to affect an economy’s accumulation of capital through its impact on investment decisions 
and, in particular, on an economy’s capacity to attract foreign direct investment.45 In this 
regard, Spain stands out for having a tax structure that has persistently taxed business 
investment returns at a level above the euro area average, even though it has decreased 
in recent years (see Chart 3.11.4).46
The main obstacles to investment, according to Spanish firms, are uncertainty, frictions 
caused by business and fiscal regulations and possible limited demand for products 
and services. According to the 2017 Survey of the European Investment Bank, in addition to 
these factors, Spanish firms mention other relevant factors such as energy costs, labour 
market regulations, the availability of staff with the right skills, the availability of internal and 
external financing and adequate transport infrastructure and access to digital infrastructure. 
In the EU as a whole, the various factors are ranked in a similar order, except for the availability 
of staff with the right skills which is attributed more importance (see Box 3.2).
The growing importance of services in advanced economies has meant that investment 
has been restructured slightly towards sectors with lower investment ratios in relative 
terms. The services industries generally have lower gross fixed capital formation to GDP 
ratios than the industrial sectors which are the traditional drivers of investment (see 
Chart 3.12.2). Accordingly, when the residential construction and general government sectors 
are excluded, investment as a percentage of value added shows a declining profile in the 
advanced economy which could be related to the process of tertiarisation.
In tandem, the investment ratio in most sectors has decreased. This has been the 
case in particular in the services sectors. Indeed, when the change in the non-residential 
4.3  GLOBAL TRENDS 
IMPACTING INVESTMENT 
LEVELS
44  See D. Dejuán, C. Ghirelli and J. S. Mora-Sanguinetti (2018), “Quality of enforcement and investment decisions. 
Firm-level evidence from Spain”, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming; M. García-Posada and J. S. 
Mora-Sanguinetti (2014), “Entrepreneurship and Enforcement Institutions: Disaggregated Evidence for Spain”, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 40, pp. 49-74; and M. García-Posada and J. S. Mora-Sanguinetti 
(2015), “Does (average) size matter? Court enforcement, business demography and firm growth”, Small 
Business Economics, 44, pp. 639-669.
45  The empirical evidence for the case of Spain indicates that higher taxation on companies triggers lower 
investment in the short term, based on both aggregate data (see P. Gil, F. Martí, R. Morris, J. J. Pérez and 
R. Ramos, (2018) “The Output Effects of Tax Changes: Narrative Evidence for Spain”, SERIES-Journal of the 
Spanish Economic Association) and individual data (see D. Dejuán and C. Ghirelli (2018), op. cit.).
46  The actual taxation of business investment is obtained from the data published by Eurostat which are 
calculated using the influential methodology proposed in M. P. Devereux and R. Griffith (1998), “Taxes and the 
Location of Production: Evidence from a Panel of U.S. Multinationals”, Journal of Public Economics, 68, pp. 
335-367 and M. P. Devereux and R. Griffith (2003), “Evaluating tax policy for location decisions”, International 
Tax and Public Finance, 10, pp. 107-126. According to this methodology, estimated taxation as a percentage 
of business investment should consider the cost for firms of the taxes, as a whole, on the purchase of 
productive assets and on the related earnings. A particularly relevant component of this calculation is the cost 
for a company of applying a tax depreciation rate to assets for corporate income tax purposes which is lower 
than the economic depreciation rate of these assets (estimated by the OECD). For a more detailed discussion, 
see D. López Rodríguez (2018), “La recaudación del impuesto sobre sociedades en España: evolución y 
limitaciones en el contexto internacional”, Boletín Económico, Banco de España, forthcoming, European 
Commission (2017), “Taxation Trends in the European Union”, Eurostat Statistical Books; and ZEW (2016), 
“Effective Tax Levels Using the Devereux-Griffith Methodology: 2016 Report”, Project for European 
Commission TAXUD 2013/CC/120.
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investment to GDP ratio in various countries is broken down into the effect of the change 
of sectoral structure, on one hand, and the effect of changes within each sector, on the 
other, the latter appears as the most relevant explanation of the changes in this variable in 
the last two decades (see Chart 3.11.3).47
Part of these developments could be explained by the interplay between sectoral 
variations and the change in relative price of investment goods with respect to 
other goods. Technological progress and notably less expensive intangible assets have 
boosted the acquisition of this type of goods in the services sectors which are 
increasingly important in terms of domestic output, such as business and financial 
services. These intangible assets generally require lower upfront outlays than tangible 
assets,48 which could explain the reduction in investment to GDP ratios in developed 
economies, without forgetting the problems associated with measuring investment in 
intangible assets. Based on the available evidence, the accumulation of intangible 
assets could have positive effects on productivity,49 as well as other implications, in 
terms of firms’ financial structures, since the characteristics of intangible assets make 
them less suitable for use as collateral or as a guarantee to obtain borrowed funds,50 
compared with tangible assets. Similarly, stronger intangibles investment has 
implications for the labour market and demand for labour since these investments 
usually require more highly skilled workers.
Noteworthy among the factors which could reduce the strength of investment in the 
developed economies are that a large number of emerging economies are now 
integrated into the world economy and that firms are increasingly international. 
Globalisation has contributed to boosting the development of global production chains, 
with a notable increase in the cross-border services trade and, in general, the 
internationalisation process of all real and financial economic activity. The outcome of this 
process has been that a growing proportion of production and world investment is located 
in emerging economies which have booming markets and lower production costs. Capital 
flows in the form of direct investment at global level reflect this shift. The available studies, 
however, show that foreign direct investment by developed economies in the last two 
decades does not appear to have been detrimental, in general, to domestic investment. 
Only in those sectors where investment is stronger in assets relating to intellectual property 
(information and communication, financial services, professional and technical activities 
and manufacturing), could foreign investment have significantly replaced domestic 
investment in recent years (see Box 3.3).
From a long-term perspective, population ageing will affect the advanced economies’ 
investment potential. Specifically, investment could suffer insofar as adverse demographic 
trends impact potential growth expectations and productivity, although the relatively 
47  The same conclusion is drawn in European Commission (2017), “Investment in the EU Member States”, 
Institutional Paper 062, October. 
48  See R. Döttling, T. Ladika and E. Perotti (2016), “The (Self-)Funding of Intangibles”, Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Papers 16-093/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
49  For example, C. Corrado, J. Haskel and C. Jona-Lasinio (2013), “Knowledge Spillovers, ICT and Productivity 
Growth”, Discussion Paper, IZA 8274.
50  However, in certain countries, such as the United States, a growing trend can be seen towards using intangible 
assets as collateral to obtain borrowed funds, especially in those sectors where the proportion of this type of 
assets is very high. See S. C. Lim, A. J. Macias and T. Moeller (2016), “Intangible Assets and Capital Structure”, 
Paris December Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI; and M. Loumioti (2012), The use of intangible assets as 
loan collateral, SSRN Paper 1748675.
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higher supply of savings will tend to bring about lower interest rates.51 The available 
research has also underlined the fact that innovation in an ageing population could be 
lower, which would reduce the marginal productivity of capital and, consequently, 
investment.52 By contrast, however, some authors have noted that ageing and technological 
progress could lead to an increase in capital intensity per employee, that will require higher 
investment levels, also as a result of the relative change in the price of productive factors, 
in a setting of tighter labour market conditions, with the result that the price of capital 
could fall in relative terms.53
51  See L. H. Summers (2014), “US economic prospects: Secular stagnation, hysteresis, and the zero lower 
bound”, Business Economics, 49, pp. 65-73.
52  Y. Aksoy, H. Basso, R. P. Smith and T. Grasl (2018), “Demographic structure and macroeconomic trends”, 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
53  See P. Butzen, S. Cheliout, E. De Prest, S. Ide and W. Melyn (2016), “Why is investment in the euro area 
continuing to show only weak recovery?”, Economic Review, National Bank of Belgium, pp. 81-98; and C. 
Goodhart and M. Pradhan (2017), Demographics Will Reverse Three Multi-Decade Global Trends, BIS Working 
Paper 656.
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BOX 3.1 INTANGIBLES INVESTMENT
The knowledge-based economy, linked to the development of 
intangible assets, has become increasingly important in 
determining the competitive advantages of firms. Specifically, 
the progress of knowledge-based activities can be divided into 
two stages: the first, focused on the development of information 
and communications technologies (ICT) (software, hardware and 
communications), has been followed by a new stage 
characterised by the investment drive in intangible assets. The 
trend towards the “tertiarisation” (a shift to services) of developed 
economies, combined with the process of technological change, 
may have significant implications for the type of capital goods in 
which firms invest, driving investment in intangible assets, linked 
to creativity and knowledge. 
The definition of intangible assets encompasses ICT, research and 
development (R&D), innovation, design, creativity, image and 
brand, organisation and specific human capital formation. 
Measurement of these concepts is not straightforward, and their 
conceptual definition has gradually broadened. In the past, the 
accounting rules treated spending on intangible assets as 
intermediate consumption expenses. However, the new system of 
accounts, ESA 2010, considers intangible assets to be 
investments. Until recently, of the three large categories of this 
type of asset,1 the national accounts only considered the 
acquisition of computer software to be investment, although the 
ESA 2010 has also incorporated spending on research and 
development. The current national accounts systems include the 
following range of specific intangible assets in the “intellectual 
property assets” category: a) computerised systems (software and 
databases) and b)  R&D, mineral exploration and entertainment, 
literary or artistic originals. However, measurement of and 
accounting for this type of asset continues to be subject to debate, 
and some authors (Corrado, Hulten and Sichel, 2006) have already 
identified a broader range of assets considered intangible. 
There are marked differences across countries regarding the 
relative significance of intangibles investment. In euro area 
countries, the rate of investment in this type of asset is less than in 
other EU economies, such as the Nordic countries or the United 
Kingdom. In the United States, investment in intangible assets is 
estimated to have even exceeded traditional investment in tangible 
assets. During the latest crisis, investment in intangible assets 
proved very resilient in most of the developed economies and, in a 
good number of them, the ratio of the assets included in the 
national accounts to GDP continued to increase. 
In the case of Spain, based on national accounts data, intangible 
assets have grown significantly, both in terms of volume and as a 
proportion of total gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). 
Specifically, these assets have risen from 7% of total GFCF in 
2008 to 14% in the last ten years (compared with tangible asset 
investment (excluding residential investment) which accounts for 
60%). Therefore, the cyclical behaviour seen in other assets has 
not been observed in intangible assets, which have grown steadily 
since 1995 at an average yearly rate of 5%.
In comparison with other countries, on average, in 1995-2016, the 
investment drive in intangible assets in Spain was lower than that 
of most other European Union countries and similar to that of 
Portugal and Italy, and behind the Nordic countries (such as 
Finland and Sweden), the United Kingdom and France (see Charts 
1 and  2). Moreover, a rising trend in investment was observed, 
most notably in Belgium, Austria, Netherlands and France, whose 
investment in intangible assets rose by around one percentage 
point in terms of GDP. In Spain, investment in this type of assets 
was 3% of GDP in 2016, compared with 1.5% in 1995.
However, as mentioned earlier, the definition of intangible assets in 
the ESA 2010 is incomplete, and it is therefore necessary to use 
databases which include other intangible assets (see Charts 3 and 4) 
in order to accurately describe their economic relevance. The 
Valencian Institute of Economic Research (IVIE, by its Spanish 
abbreviation)2 provides an estimate for a broader range of assets. 
ICTs are wide-reaching technologies that impact on all sectors, 
but only if they are accompanied by further innovations. In this 
respect, some intangible assets not included in the ESA 2010, 
relating to organisation and the people using ICT, enable the latter 
to make a greater contribution to economic growth. The assets not 
included in the ESA 2010 account for a larger share of GDP than 
the intangible assets that are included. This discrepancy has been 
reduced over time, owing to the broader inclusion of such assets 
in the national accounts.
Thus, in 2014, the intangible assets included in the ESA 2010 
represented 3% of GDP, while those that were not, represented 
3.5%. As regards the composition of intangible asset 
investment (according to the IVIE’s broad definition), the most 
significant component is that relating to economic competencies 
(around 40% of total intangible asset investment), closely 
followed by investment in innovative property. The two most 
noteworthy subcomponents are R&D investment and 
investments to improve the organisational structure of firms 
1  Investment in intangible assets is usually classified under three 
categories: a)  computer software and databases; b)  research and 
development or other activities that may give rise to intellectual property 
rights of a scientific or artistic nature, and c) economic competencies, 
such as improvements in employee skills, in organisational structure or 
brand reputation development. 
2  See M. Mas and J. Quesada (dirs.) (2014), Activos intangibles: Una 
inversión necesaria para el crecimiento económico en España (Intangible 
assets. A necessary investment for economic growth in Spain) Ariel and 
Fundación Telefónica, Barcelona 
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BOX 3.1 INTANGIBLES INVESTMENT (cont’d)
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BOX 3.1 INTANGIBLES INVESTMENT (cont’d)
(18% and 15.5% of total investment in intangible assets, 
respectively). Lastly, some heterogeneity was observed in the 
changes affecting the subcomponents over time. Particularly 
noteworthy was the considerable rise in investments in software 
and databases and innovative property, with cumulative 
increases of 187% and 147% between 1995 and 2014, 
respectively, while investments in advertising and market 
research decreased as a proportion of total investment in 
intangible assets during the same period.
Finally, the relative significance of the determinants of investment is 
of particular interest when exploring the ratio of tangible to intangible 
investment. Some authors3 have found evidence pointing to the role 
played by firm size and product and labour market regulation as the 
main drivers of investment in intangible assets. In addition, this type 
of investment seems to be less dependent on the economic cycle 
and the financial position of firms than tangible asset investment, 
with internal financing playing a relatively more significant role4.
3  C. Corrado, J. Haskel, C. Jona-Lasino and M. Iomni (2016), “Intangible 
investment in the EU and US before and since the Great Reccesion and 
its contribution to productivity growth” Working Paper No 2016/08, 
European Investment Bank.
4  European Investment Bank (2017), “From recovery to sustainable 
growth”. Investment Report No 2017/2018, European Investment Bank.
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BOX 3.2 THE BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM INVESTMENT PERCEIVED BY SPANISH AND EUROPEAN FIRMS
In 2016, in order to better understand the investment decisions 
of European companies, the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
began to prepare annually the EIB Group Survey on Investment 
and Investment Finance (EIBIS). This survey includes interviews 
of around 12,500 firms from the 28 EU Member States,1 
approximately 500 of which are Spanish. The firms are of all 
sizes, are from the main sectors and offer qualitative and 
quantitative information2 on their investment activities, finance 
needs and the difficulties they face. The results from the first two 
waves of this survey (2016 and 2017) are currently available. This 
box analyses Spanish firms’ responses to the questions in the 
questionnaire relating to the obstacles they perceive and to the 
investment gap (relationship between the investment level and 
the investment that ensures the success of their business going 
forward). These results are compared with those of the EU 
companies surveyed, as a whole.
Uncertainty about the future and, next in order, business 
regulations (licences, permits, etc.) and taxation, and demand for 
products and services, are the obstacles indicated by a higher 
proportion of Spanish firms both in the 2016 and 2017 waves3 (see 
Chart 1). Next are energy costs, labour market regulations and the 
availability of staff with the rights skills. The perception of the 
availability of finance, which includes both internal and external 
financing, is in seventh position. Lastly, the factors mentioned by a 
smaller number of companies are availability of adequate transport 
infrastructure and access to digital infrastructure.
In the EU as a whole, the order of the different factors is observed 
to be very similar, the main exception being the availability of staff 
with the right skills, an obstacle which is of relatively greater 
importance in the EU. These differences are consistent with the 
higher unemployment rate in Spain, which means that, in principle, 
it has a greater surplus of available labour.
The results for Spain show a higher proportion of firms reporting 
each obstacle, except for the availability of staff with the right 
skills, where the level is similar. Given that the perceptions about 
the obstacles are subjective, it is possible that, since the economic 
and financial crisis was relatively more severe in Spain, Spanish 
companies may tend to perceive that each obstacle represents a 
barrier to investment. Certain cultural aspects could also play a 
significant role in explaining these differences. Thus, for example 
in the case of the availability of finance, the available objective 
indicators approximating this concept, such as the proportion of 
firms whose access to bank finance is restricted4 show similar 
results in the two areas (around 6%). That seems to suggest that 
Spanish companies are more inclined to report obstacles than 
other European companies.
If the results of the two available waves are compared, the 
proportion of companies reporting obstacles in the two areas is 
seen to decrease in the 2017 wave compared with the previous 
wave. However, this is more pronounced in Spain which could be 
linked to cyclical factors and, in particular, to the stronger 
economic recovery in Spain.
Using a linear probability model which controls for characteristics 
at firm level,5 such as size, age of the firm, access barriers to 
external bank finance, productivity, sector and balance sheet 
situation (profit ratios, leverage and liquidity), generally, those 
firms with a worse economic and net worth position which are 
less productive are observed to have a greater likelihood of 
reporting obstacles to investment. This effect is more significant 
for obstacles relating to the availability of finance, access to 
digital infrastructure and energy costs in the case of Spain and for 
obstacles relating to the availability of finance, business 
regulations, energy costs and the availability of staff with the right 
skills, in the case of Europe. Thus, for example, in the case of the 
availability of finance, an increase of 10 pp in the indebtedness 
ratio means an increase of 2.7 pp in the probability of reporting 
that obstacle for Spain (1.5 pp for the EU). Financially constrained 
firms have a higher probability of reporting any obstacle, 
especially in the case of the availability of finance, for which the 
probability of reporting this obstacle increases to 18  pp for 
Spanish firms (22  pp for European firms). Generally, SMEs and 
younger companies (approximated as those which have been in 
business for less than ten years) do not have a greater probability 
of encountering a given obstacle than other firms. Some barriers, 
such as those relating to labour market and business regulations 
are more likely to be reported by infrastructure firms and those in 
the construction sector.
Another aspect covered by the EIBIS is the investment gap 
perceived by firms, that is, the fact that they consider that the 
investment made in the last three years has been too little to 
ensure the success of their business going forward. The 
1  The methodology of the EIBIS is available at http://www.eib.org/
attachments/eibis_methodology_report_2017_en.pdf.
2  The questionnaire used in 2016 is available at http://www.eib.org/
attachments/eibis_general_module_questionnaire_2016_en.pdf. Small 
changes were made to it in the 2017 wave, but the structure remains 
the same.
3  The proportion of firms reporting each obstacle is constructed as 
follows: if an obstacle is reported as a major obstacle, it is given a 
weighting equal to unity, whereas if it is reported as a minor obstacle, its 
weight is 0.5.
4  Firms in any of the following situations are considered financially 
constrained: their loan applications have been rejected, they have only 
been granted a portion of the funds requested, the loan was extended 
but at a cost they consider to be very high and those companies which 
did not apply for external finance because they thought they would be 
turned down.
5  Some of these variables are available in the survey itself and others 
were obtained by matching the survey with the database of Amadeus.
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¥Profitability  ratiot–1 -0.283*** -0.291*** -0.287*** -0.290*** -0.289*** -0.293*** -0.279*** -0.290*** -0.291*** -0.273***
¥Indebtedness ratiot–1 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.047**
¥Liquidity ratiot–1 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0,010 -0.032 -0.032 -0.016
¥Total factor productivityit -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.023***
Financially constrained (c) 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.187*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.182***
§SME 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.018 0,020 0.013 0.021 0.019 0.012
§Young firm (<10 years old) -0.024 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.030* -0.025 -0.025 -0.029*
§Construction sector -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0,000 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.010
§Services sector -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017
§Infrastructure sector -0.045** -0.046** -0.044** -0.045** -0.046** -0.043** -0.046** -0.046** -0.046** -0.045**
Minor 0.024* 0.019
Major 0.074*** 0.054**
Minor 0.018** 0.004
Major 0.042*** 0.008
910.0-100.0roniM
600.0-**330.0rojaM
710.0-700.0roniM
900.0-820.0rojaM
500.0510.0roniM
**720.0***050.0rojaM
810.0*420.0roniM
610.0***530.0rojaM
***940.0***940.0roniM
***421.0***031.0rojaM
Minor 0.008 -0.017*
Major 0.009 -0.031*
Minor 0.014* -0.009
Major 0,010 -0.032
Fixed effects country /year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
932,8552,8452,8152,8452,8452,8452,8552,8652,8052,8snoitavresbO
770.0560.0370.0950.0160.0260.060.060.0160.060.0derauqs-R
§Avail. of staff with right skills
§Availability of finance
§Transport infrastructure
§Digital infrastructure
§Uncertainty
§Business regulations
§Demand
§Energy costs
§Labour market regulations
Table 1
RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATION OF A MODEL OF THE PROBABILITY THAT A FIRM WILLL REPORT AN INVSTEMENT GAP.
SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN FIRMS (a) (b) (c) (d)
SOURCES: 2016 and 2017 EIBIS.
a The regression is based on EIBIS and ORBIS information for the period 2016-2017. The coefficients are obtained from a linear probability model with country and 
year fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected and clustered at country level. *, ** and *** indicate significance for confidence levels of 90%, 95% and 99%, 
respectively.
b The variables with the ¥ symbol are defined as follows: profitability ratio as profit before interest and taxes to total assets; indebtedness ratio as interest-bearing 
debt to total assets; liquidity ratio as cash and cash equivalents to total assets; total factor productivity as logarithmic variable based on the firm's value added 
and the factors of production used.
c Financially constrained is a binary variable which takes a value of one for those firms in any of the following situations: their loan applications were rejected, they 
have only been granted a portion of the funds requested, the loan was extended to the companies but at a cost they consider to be very high and those 
companies which did not apply for external finance because they thought they would be turned down.
d The variables with the § symbol are dichotomic and take the value of one if the firm belongs to the group with the corresponding characteristic or if the firm reports 
that obstacle and to what degree. Otherwise, the variable takes the value of zero.
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THE BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM INVESTMENT PERCEIVED BY SPANISH AND EUROPEAN FIRMS (cont’d)
proportion of Spanish firms that stated in the 2017 wave that 
they suffered from an investment gap stands at around 20%, this 
percentage being higher among firms in the construction and 
infrastructure sector and at large corporations (see Panel 2 of 
Chart 1). In 2016, this percentage was slightly lower for Spanish 
firms, as a whole. Compared with European firms, the proportion 
of Spanish companies which reported having an investment gap 
is around 4 pp higher, that difference is more pronounced in the 
construction and infrastructure sector, although also among 
large corporations and mature firms (doing business for more 
than ten years).
Table 1 shows the results, for the overall sample of EU firms, of a 
linear probability model’s estimation that a European firm will state 
that it has an investment gap. The same explanatory variables of 
the model above are included as well as a dichotomic variable 
which takes unit value if the company report a particular obstacle. 
First, the results show that less profitable, more indebted, less 
productive firms belonging to the infrastructure sector have a 
higher probability of reporting an investment gap than others, 
these differences being statistically significant. The probability of 
financially constrained firms reporting an investment gap is 14 pp 
higher than for other companies. 
The results indicate that reporting any of the obstacles included in 
the survey increase the probability of having an investment gap. 
Furthermore, this effect is amplified when the obstacle is perceived 
as a major one, irrespective of the obstacle in question. Those with 
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Uncertainty Business
regulations
Demand Energy costs Labour
regulations
Avail. staff
with right skills
Availability of
finance
Transport
infrastructure
Digital
infrastructure
%
1  WEIGHTED PROPORTION OF FIRMS REPORTING AN OBSTACLE (a)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Total Manu-
facturing
Construction Services Infrastructures SMEs Large corp. Less than
10 years old
More than
10 years old
%
2  PROPORTION OF FIRMS REPORTING AN INVESTMENT GAP (b)
Chart 1
OBSTACLES TO LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND THE PERCEIVED INVESTMENT GAP
SOURCE: 2016 and 2017 EIBIS.
a The proportion of firms reporting each obstacle is constructed as follows: if an obstacle is reported as a major obstacle it is given a weight of one, whereas if it 
is reported as a minor obstacle, its weight is 0.5.
b Percentage of firms stating that they have invested too little in the last three years to ensure the success of their business going forward.
 EU 2017  SPAIN 2016 SPAIN 2017 EU 2016
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a stronger impact are: the availability of finance6 (reporting this 
obstacle as major increases the probability of having an investment 
gap by 13 pp), followed by uncertainty (the effect is 7 pp) and, to a 
lesser degree, labour market and business regulations (4 pp-5 pp). 
These results are in line with the main determinants of investment 
indicated by the economic literature.
The qualitative findings obtained for the sub-sample of Spanish firms is 
generally in line with the findings for the whole sample. In Spain the 
obstacle with the most important effects on the investment gap is 
uncertainty which represents an increase of 11 pp in the probability of 
reporting an investment gap, compared with 7  pp for the overall 
sample. The other obstacles do not have statistically significant effects, 
although it should be noted that in this case the coefficients are 
estimated more imprecisely given the small sample size. In Spain firms 
belonging to the construction sector present a higher probability of 
reporting an investment gap, whereas in the EU no difference in 
probability is found between firms belonging to this sector and those in 
the services and manufacturing sector. These differences are consistent 
with the greater severity of the crisis in the construction sector in Spain.
6  In Table 1, the “obstacle to finance” variable is defined as those firms 
that are not finance-constrained but which state that the availability 
of finance is an obstacle to investment; in order to avoid the 
correlation between these two variables and to measure the effect of 
the “availability of finance” obstacle for those firms which are not 
finance-constrained.
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The last two decades have seen the growing internationalisation of 
firms, while a large number of emerging countries have become 
part of the global value chain. Both processes have been driven by 
technological developments in the area of communication 
networks and information (since these developments have 
substantially reduced costs), by the liberalisation of capital 
movements in various regions and by the signing of a number of 
trade and economic integration agreements (such as the creation 
of the euro area and the European Union, and their enlargement to 
Eastern European countries, or China joining the World Trade 
Organization). All of these factors have contributed to boosting the 
development of global production chains, a notable increase in the 
cross-border services trade and, in general, to the globalisation of 
all economic activity. As a result of this process a growing 
proportion of world production and investment has been located 
in emerging economies, with expanding markets and lower 
production costs.
The impact on investment in the developed economies of this shift 
in capital flows towards the new emerging markets depends on 
whether that foreign investment is a substitute for domestic 
investment (negative correlation) or if the relationship between the 
two is complementary (positive correlation). In principle, since 
both compete for financial resources that have a rising cost, a 
substitutionary relationship can be expected between domestic 
investment and foreign investment. This hypothesis was supported 
by the first empirical studies on this relationship, based on OECD 
country data, and by more recent studies on Japanese firms or 
SOURCES: OECD, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Intellectual property investment as a proportion of total investment.
b A: agriculture; B: mining; C: manufacturing industry; F: construction; G: retail H: transport; I: hotels, restaurants; J: information, communication; K: financial services; 
M: professional services; N: administrative activities.
c Assessed as the median intangible intensity for each sector.
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developing economies.1 However, firms operating in several 
countries can access financial resources in different local markets 
and redistribute them among the group companies according to 
their objectives. In these circumstances, the interaction between 
domestic investment and foreign investment is chiefly determined 
by factors relating to the characteristics of the productive process.
The international expansion of firms may adopt various forms 
which combine two stylised alternatives of the type of integration 
of the productive process (vertical or horizontal) to a greater or 
lesser degree. Where production is fragmented into stages 
distributed across different geographical areas (vertical 
integration), occasionally structured in the form of value chains, 
the investment made in the different areas will be complementary, 
either as a simultaneous response to changes in the determinants 
of the firm’s global investment or because production abroad 
requires inputs produced by the parents or vice versa. Conversely, 
if the internationalisation is based on plants in different 
geographical locations which replicate the same type of productive 
process (horizontal integration), —possibly as a result of a decision 
to replace exports to these markets with localised production, in 
order to save on transport costs, benefit from potential labour cost 
advantages, remove the impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers—, 
foreign investment would replace domestic investment. In the last 
two decades, the internationalisation of production has evolved 
along both lines, through the strong growth of global value chains 
(vertical integration) and also through the delocalisation of 
domestic production, generally that with lower added value. The 
foreign plants of firms with a more horizontal structure tend to use 
certain intermediate inputs simultaneously —for example, 
activities with a technological content linked to creativity and 
knowledge— which are usually “non-rival” (they may be used 
simultaneously at several plants), unlike many of the intermediate 
inputs in the value chains.
Both forms of integration are likely to coexist within a firm or sector 
of activity, although the technological characteristics of the 
productive process are a major factor determining the type of 
integration. To examine what type of relationship is prevalent 
between domestic investment in the developed economies and 
their foreign direct investment, an equation for sectoral gross 
capital formation has been estimated, including industrial and 
services sectors. The data correspond to 19 productive sectors 
(ISIC 4, highest level) in 19 advanced economies in 1995-2014. 
Under the neoclassical theoretical framework, each sector’s 
investment depends on the demand outlook, reflected by the level 
of activity or added value, and the user cost of capital,2 in addition 
to the foreign direct investment of that sector to capture the 
possible ef fects of complementarity/substitution mentioned 
above. Moreover, the equation includes a horizontal integration 
indicator (the proportion of investment made by each sector in 
intellectual property assets) to capture the characteristics of the 
productive process of each sector (see Chart 1). The idea behind 
this indicator is that the intensity of investment in intangible assets, 
which are intermediate inputs that may be used on a non-rival 
basis by several plants, is indicative of the degree of horizontal 
integration in each sector.3 This variable interacts with foreign 
direct investment to capture its differential effect on domestic 
investment in the sectors with the highest proportion of intangible 
assets (higher degree of horizontal integration).
The results of these estimates indicate that a positive relationship 
(complementary) between sectoral gross capital formation and 
foreign direct investment (see Chart 2) predominates in the 
developed economies, and is consistent with the growth of 
global production chains based mainly on the complementarity 
of the productive process.4 However, in the sectors with a higher 
proportion of intangible assets, for example, information and 
communication (J), financial services (K) and professional and 
technical activities (M), the complementary relationship is less 
clear and can even become substitutive (based on analysis of 
the median sector). In the case of Spain, which does not differ 
substantially from the characteristics identified in the median of 
the sectors, the impact of foreign investment on domestic 
investment would be similar to that shown in Chart 2, clarifying 
that the extractive, manufacturing and retail sectors are less 
intensive in their use of intangible assets, and their impact on 
domestic investment would therefore be more positive than that 
reflected by the median of these sectors. Consequently, foreign 
direct investment by developed economies in the last two 
decades does not in principle appear to have been detrimental 
for domestic investment. Only in sectors with a high intensity of 
investment in intellectual property assets —whose weight in 
total investment varies across countries—, can foreign 
investment contribute to explaining the weak growth of 
investment in recent years.
1  See M.S. Feldstein (1995), “The Effects of Outbound Foreign Direct 
Investment on the Domestic Capital Stock” in M. Feldstein and G. 
Hubbard eds. The effect of taxation on multinational corporations, 
University of Chicago Press, 43-66; R. Belderbos, K. Fukao, K. Ito and W. 
Letterie. (2013), “Global Fixed Capital Investment by Multinational Firms”, 
Economica, 80, 274-299, London School of Economics and A. Al-Sadig 
(2013), “Outward Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Investment: 
the Case of Developing Countries”, IMF Working Paper 13/52.
2  User cost of capital is the result of the price of investment goods relative 
to the production price in each sector and the long-term real interest rate 
less the depreciation rate of capital.
3  P. Braunerhjelm, L. Oxelheim and P. Thulin (2005), “The relationship 
between domestic and outward foreign direct investment: The role of 
industry-specific effects”, International Business Review 14, 677-694, 
use this indicator to conduct a similar exercise for Swedish industrial 
sectors.
4  M. A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley and J. R. Hines Jr. (2005), “Foreign Direct 
Investment and the Domestic Capital Stock”, American Economic 
Activity Papers and Proceedings, May, 33-38, also finds a complementary 
relationship in the case of US multinationals.
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STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND INVESTMENT
Structural reform in product markets, aimed at increasing 
competition and reducing business mark-ups, raise the level of 
activity in the economy in the medium and long term. By reducing 
the inefficiencies deriving from the excessive market power of 
firms, these reforms enhance the economy’s efficiency in the long 
term, and, therefore, the expectation of increased activity in the 
future may stimulate consumption and, above all, investment, 
when structural reforms are announced,1 even in a context of 
deleveraging by households and businesses, such as that faced 
by the Spanish economy in recent years.2
This box analyses whether these arguments are applicable to 
Spain, using a macroeconomic model for this purpose.3 
Specifically, a model of a monetary union comprising two regions 
of different sizes is used, calibrated in this case to represent 
Spain and the rest of the euro area.4 In this model, the households 
and firms of each country have long-term debt, and their 
borrowing capacity is constrained by the value of their assets, 
which serve as guarantees or collateral. On this basis, a structural 
reform consisting of a permanent reduction of firms’ unit margins 
is simulated. In addition to the “normal times” scenario, two 
further setups are considered: one in which there is a parallel 
process of private-sector deleveraging and another in which, in 
addition to the foregoing, monetary policy is constrained by the 
lower bound of interest rates.
Charts 1 and 2 show the marginal effect of this reform on GDP and 
investment under each of the three scenarios. The model 
simulations confirm, first of all, that these reforms are clearly 
expansionary in normal times (blue lines in the charts), both for 
GDP and investment, for the reasons discussed above.
Secondly, the results in a context of private-sector deleveraging 
(red lines in the charts) show that, although a situation of severe 
financial constraints may indeed diminish the effectiveness of 
these structural reforms in the short run, their immediate effect 
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IN NORMAL TIMES WITH DELEVERAGING WITH DELEVERAGING AND LOWER BOUND TO INTEREST RATES
1  See M. Draghi (2017), Introductory remarks at the European Central 
Bank Conference “Structural reforms in the euro area”, Frankfurt am 
Main, 18 October 2017. However, part of the literature of recent years 
has underscored that, in certain situations, there may be adverse effects 
in the short run. In particular, in a seminal article by Eggertsson et al. 
(2014) [See G. Eggertsson, A. Ferrero and A. Raffo (2014), “Can 
structural reforms help Europe?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 61, 
pp. 2-22] the authors argue that these structural reforms may have a 
negative impact in the short and medium term if monetary policy is 
constrained by the lower bound of interest rates and does not have the 
capacity to accommodate the deflationary effects of lower margins in 
product markets, resulting in higher real interest rates, the contractionary 
effect of which could outweigh the positive effects of the reforms 
themselves, at least in the short run.
2  Moreover, it could be argued that, in an economy facing severe financial 
constraints and undergoing a process of deleveraging of the private 
sector, the difficulties in gaining access to financing to undertake new 
consumption and investment plans could reduce agents’ capacity to 
materialise in the present some of the future positive effects of the 
reform, so that the effects in the short run would be limited despite the 
expectation of activity growth in the future.
3  Véase Ó. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2016), ”Policy Spillovers and 
Synergies in a Monetary Union”, International Journal of Central 
Banking, 12, pp. 219-277.
4  This structure based on several countries is essential for the simulation 
exercises in this box: the results of the Arce at al. model would be similar 
to those of Eggertsson et al (2014) if the simulated structural reforms 
were applied to the euro area as a whole and not only to part of it. The 
forthcoming publication by J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and S. Hurtado (2018), 
“Internal Devaluations in a Monetary Union: Labour vs Product Market 
Reforms”, Working Paper, Banco de España, analyses in greater depth 
the effect of the size of the area implementing the reform, and concludes 
that, in a situation of interest rates constrained by their lower bound, the 
short-term impact of increased competition in product markets is 
positive as long as the area implementing the reforms accounts for less 
than 60% of the monetary union.
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continues to be clearly positive, both on GDP and on investment. 
An important channel for achieving this is the incentive to invest 
generated by the reform, which favours the revaluation of assets 
and leads to increases in the net worth of indebted households 
and firms, thus allowing for the intensity, duration and 
contractionary effects of the deleveraging process to be reduced.5
Lastly, if, in addition to a deleveraging process in Spain, the 
monetary union as a whole is constrained by the lower bound of 
interest rates (yellow lines in the charts), the results of the model 
show that the short-term effectiveness of these reforms in 
stimulating activity is further reduced, although the reform still 
maintains a clearly positive effect on investment and economic 
activity both in the short and long term. The reform is deflationary, 
and since monetary policy cannot accommodate such a shock by 
further reducing interest rates, there is an increase in real interest 
rates, whose contractionary effects, however, do not manage to 
outweigh the positive effects of the reform itself.
In short, the exercises in this box highlight the positive effects on 
GDP that the reforms aimed at increasing competition in the 
product markets may give rise to. The upturn in investment 
following implementation of such a reform is the channel through 
which entrepreneurs reflect the short-term expectation of a 
permanently more efficient and dynamic economy. Furthermore, 
this type of policy has robust expansionary effects, even in a 
complex macroeconomic context in which agents are faced with 
the need to reduce their debt and monetary policy has little room 
for further interest rate cuts.
5  For a detailed analysis of the mechanism whereby the product market 
reforms shorten the process of private-sector deleveraging, see J. 
Andrés, Ó. Arce, and C. Thomas (2017), “Structural Reforms in a Debt 
Overhang”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 88, pp. 15-34.
